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GAO Review of Contraci Appeal Board Decisions*
I. INTRODUCTION
Government contract disputes, while posing problems sim-
ilar in many respects to those of private contracts, are compli-
cated by the fact that one of the parties is the United States Gov-
ernment. While the private contractor wants to insure the
availability of a remedy at all times, the Government is con-
cerned with the possibility that a disruption in performance may
frustrate the governmental purpose. In response to these often
conflicting interests, the administrative settlement procedures
have as their goal the resolution of contractors' claims without
the disruption of work which often occurs during ordinary
breach of contract proceedings.1
II. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS PROCEDURE AND
THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
The administrative procedure for settling contract disputes2
is contractually established by the standard disputes clause con-
* The author would like to thank the General Accounting Office
and the Air Force for their generosity in supplying materials used in
writing this Note.
1. See Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals, 29 LAW & CONTmvP. PROB. 39, 39-43 (1964).
2. Such an administrative procedure evolved over an extensive
period of time. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Adams, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 463 (1868), first recognized the authority of an execu-
tively created board to decide claims against the Government as a
necessary incident to the successful completion of the department's
duties. Ten years later, in Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398 (1878),
the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a finality clause. In so hold-
ing, the Court observed that general contract law allows parties to agree
to be bound by a designated person amd that a contract clause may
clearly express that intent.
Prior to World War I, no administrative agency had established a
formal procedure for appealing decisions under finality clauses. But in
1918, the War Department issued a standard contract form which pro-
vided the contractor with an option to appeal to the Secretary of War.
Later that year, a board was established as the Secretary's representa-
tive in handling the resulting appeals. Since then, a number of appeal
boards have been established and abandoned but they now generally
have an important role in government contracting. See generally H.
PETROWITZ, OPERATION AND EFFEcTrVENEss OF GOVERNMENT BOARDS OF
CONTRACT APPEALS, S. Doc. No. 99, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [herein-
after cited as SENATE REPORT].
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tained in government contracts.3 The clause by its terms applies
only to questions of fact which are "not disposed of by agree-
ment."14 This contemplates that some disputes will be informally
settled between the private contractor and the Government's
contracting officer, thereby eliminating the need to resort to a
formal dispute procedure. If agreement cannot be reached on
this basis, however, the clause requires that the contracting offi-
cer decide the question of fact and furnish a written copy of his
decision to the contractor. The contractor must comply with
this opinion, even if adverse to him, thereby insuring that per-
formance will be continued. If he believes the government
officer's decision is erroneous, the contractor may appeal to the
secretary of the department within 30 days. If such an appeal
is not initiated, the opinion of the contracting officer becomes
final and binding upon both parties.5
Appeal to the secretary places the claim before a board of
3. The language of this clause is as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute
concerning a question of fact arising under this contract
which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by
the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to
writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the
Contractor. The decision of the Contracting Officer shall
be final and conclusive unless, within 30 days from the
date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails or other-
wise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written appeal
addressed to the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary or
his duly authorized representative for the determination of
such appeals shall be final and conclusive unless determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent,
or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as neces-
sarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial
evidence. In connection with any appeal proceeding un-
der this clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an oppor-
tunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of its
appeal. Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the
Contractor shall proceed diligently with the performance of
the contract and in accordance with the Contracting Offi-
cer's decision.(b) This "Disputes" clause does not preclude consideration of
law questions in connection with decisions provided for in
paragraph (a) of this section: Provided, That nothing in
this contract shall be construed as making final the decision
of any administrative official, representative, or board on a
question of law.
32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12 (1969), cited in Hearings on Operation and Effective-
ness of Government Boards of Contract Appeals Before the Subcomm. of
the Select Comm. on Small Business, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 16-17 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings].
4. Id.
5. See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 2.
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contract appeals.6 While maintaining a procedure which is "suf-
ficiently brief and uncomplicated as to be useful to a small un-
represented contractor, ' 7 contract appeal boards have increas-
ingly sought to function as quasi-ju.dicial bodies affording appel-
lants the procedural safeguards of due process. The procedure
of the various boards is by no means uniform, but that used by
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals is typical.8 One
of the 25 members of the Armed Services Board presides over
an initial hearing on the disputed claim. At this hearing, he
examines the past record, attempts to discover de novo the perti-
nent facts surrounding the disputes, and prepares a report set-
ting forth his findings. On the basis of this report, five members
of the board decide the case. Their decision is automatically re-
viewed by the chairman and two vice-chairmen of the board.
If one of the five members disagrees with the majority's disposi-
tion of the case, he can request that the dispute be decided by a
majority vote of the chairman and two vice-chairmen. 9
While the effectiveness of contract appeal boards varies
among governmental departments, the boards are generally cred-
ited with doing an adequate job of equitably settling contract
disputes.10  Appearing before a Senate subcommittee in 1966,
Louis Spector, then chairman of the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals, stated:
Focusing specifically on the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals, it can appropriately be viewed as an important link
in a chain between a multiplicity of contracting officers, at one
end of the chain, and an occasional lawsuit at the other end.
The board, by furnishing the appellate benefits of these "dis-
putes" procedures, exercises a strong inhibiting influence upon
unnecessary contract appeals and litigation, at both ends of this
chain."1
Thus, the standard disputes clause provides the private con-
tractor with a relatively efficient and inexpensive method of
settlement for contractually waivi.g his traditional right to stop
performance and to bring a suit for breach of contract.12
6. Appeal boards are the duly authorized representatives of de-
partment secretaries. See generally, SENATE REPORT, supra note 2.
7. See 1966 Hearings, supra note 32, at 5.
8. 32 C.F.R. § 30.1 (1969) establishes the procedure used by the
Board.
9. See 1966 Hearings, supra note 3, at 8; SENATE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 43.
10. See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 2.
11. 1966 Hearings, supra note 3, at 3-4.
12. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
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Within this administrative framework, the United States
General Accounting Office (GAO) has consistently maintained
its right to review the decisions of the various boards of contract
appeals, 13 despite objections from administrative agencies. Bas-
ing its position principally upon two statutes-the Budget and
Accounting Act of 192114 and the Wunderlich Act' 8 -the GAO
has established itself as an additional level of administrative
review.
Reaction by government agencies to GAO review has de-
pended upon the contract appeal board's determination. When
the board decision has been unfavorable to the Government, the
agency involved, having no standing to sue in the courts,16 has
itself sought GAO review when the decision was thought to be
unjust. But when a private contractor unsuccessful at the board
level seeks GAO review, the agencies, as may be expected, have
usually objected. The agencies assert that the contractors, un-
like the agencies, are not barred from seeking relief in court-a
step which if taken would bring the issue before a competent
judicial body. The agencies also point out that they are bound
by GAO decisions, 17 since there is no administrative or judicial
means to reinstate the awards won by the agencies at the board
level. Recently, the United States Attorney General has sup-
ported the agencies' position.'8
13. 46 CoMP. GEN. 441 (1966).
14. 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1964):
All claims and demands whatever by the Government of the
United States or against it, and all accounts whatever in which
the Government of the United States is concerned, either as
debtor or creditor, shall be settled and adjusted in the General
Accounting Office.
Moreover, section 74 provides that balances certified by the Comptroller
General are binding upon the executive branch of the Government.
15. 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1964):
No provision of any contract ... relating to the finality or con-
clusiveness of any decision of the head of any department or
agency or his duly authorized representative or board in a dis-
pute involving a question arising under such contract, shall be
pleaded... as limiting judicial review of any such decision to
cases where fraud. is alleged. Provided, however, That any
such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is
fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly errone-
ous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by
substantial evidence.
Section 322 provides: "No Government contract shall contain a provi-
sion making final on a question of law the decision of any administrative
official, representative, or board."
16. A difference of opinion, however, presently exists on this point.
See § IV infra.
17. 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1964).18. Op,. ATT'Y GEN. (Jan. 16, 1969). . ..
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Thus, the GAO and the agencies have expressed what ap-
pear to be irreconcilable positions in regard to the review prop-
erly exercisable by the GAO.' 9 The conflict, however, could
probably be resolved if both sides would confront the policy
considerations honestly. This Note will examine the present
appeal procedure for contract disputes and the relative merits
of the current conflict. It is hoped that the solution which is
offered will satisfactorily accommodate the interests of both po-
sitions.
III. PRESENT ROLE OF THE GAO
IN CONTRACT DISPUTES
A. ExpIpss AuTHoRITY OF THE GAG'
Created by the Budget and Accounting Act of 192120 as a
legislative, rather than an executive creature,21 the GAO exer-
cises extensive control over the financial activities of govern-
mental agencies. Such an overseeing body was believed neces-
sary to aid Congress in maintaining effective financial control
over the executive branch.22 The GAO, under the direction of
the Comptroller General, performs auditing functions over all
federal accounts and is responsible for maintaining uniform fed-
eral accounting procedures.23 It also makes periodic reports to
Congress on the financial operation of government agencies. 24
To insure that the GAO would be able to accomplish its
statutory objectives, Congress granted it broad authority to set-
tle claims against the Government. The Act provided that
[a]ll claims and demands whatever by the Government of the
United States or against it, and all accounts whatever in which
19. Some commentators have questioned whether the GAO should
exercise any review powers at all. See Spector, Is It "Bianches Ghost"
-Or "Much Ado About Nothing"? 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 87, 103-13
(1964); Note, S & E Contractors and The GAO Role in Government
Contract Disputes: A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Finality,
55 VA. L. Rav. 762, 782-83 (1969); Note, Alice in Wunderlich: The
Attorney General's Dream of Limiting the GAO's Claim Settlement
Authority, 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 544 (1969).
20. 31 U.S.C. § 41 (1964).
21. Its status as a legislative agency was reaffirmed in 1950 with
the passage of the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950, 31 U.S.C. § 65
(1964). As a result, the GAO reports, and is accountable, only to
Congress and not to the Executive, 31 U.S.C. § 67(c) (1964).
22. See MAcHINERY AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE, THE GoVERN-
IENT CONTRACTOR AND THE GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICER 17-18 (1966).
23. Id. at 8-13.
24. Id. at 13.
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the Government of the United States is concerned, either as
debtor or creditor, shall be settled and adjusted in the General
Accounting Office. 25
Another section of the Act binds the Executive to the GAO's
settlement of public accounts.26 Thus, the Act, literally read,
gives the GAO unlimited authority to settle the claims of dis-
gruntled government contractors.2 7
Consequently, the GAO since 1921 has consistently asserted
that its right to review administrative decisions is as extensive
as that exercised by the courts. In refusing to overturn the
Secretary of Labor's factual finding, the Comptroller General
in 1939 stated:
The courts have consistently held that it is proper for parties
to a contract to designate a particular person to decide disputed
questions and that decisions on such disputed questions by the
person so designated are final and conclusive on the parties to
the contract in the absence of fraud or of mistake so gross as
necessarily to imply bad faith.2s
But like the judiciary, the GAO limited the application of this
standard to questions of fact, and maintained that a contract
appeal board acting pursuant to the contract disputes clause
could not give finality to questions of law. 29 Rather, the GAO,
relying on the 1921 Act,30 specifically reserved that power for
itself.
B. THE ScoPE OF JUDICIAL REviEW
In adopting the same standards for review that were used
by courts, the GAO was unaware that the scope of judicial re-
view would eventually be restricted. In 1950, the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Moorman3l declared that
when parties to a government contract provide for a designated
party to conclusively settle disputes, such provision should not
be frustrated by judicial interpretation even if the designated
25. 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1964).
26. 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1964): "Balances certified by the General Ac-
counting Office, upon the settlement of public accounts, shall be final
and conclusive upon the Executive Branch of the Government .... "
27. For a discussion of this power, see Note, The Comptroller Gen-
rat of the United States: The Broad Power to Settle and Adjust All
Claims and Accounts, 70 HAnv. L. REv. 350 (1956).
28. 19 Comp. GEN. 568, 572 (1939).
29. E.g., 46 CoMP. GEN. 441 (1966); 4 Com. Gm. 404 (1924);
Com. GEN. unpublished opinion B-156192 (Dec. 8, 1966).
30. 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1964).
31. 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
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party decided a question of law. Judicial review was further
curtailed a year later when the Supreme Court in United States
v. Wunderlich82 held that decisions of contract appeal boards
should not be overturned unless fraud on the part of the con-
tracting officer is alleged and proved. By so holding, the Court
overturned the long established principle that court action was
justified if the decision was so grossly erroneous that it neces-
sarily implied bad faith.3 3  The GAO, which had long tied its
review power to that of the courts, was forced to concede that its
power fell with that of the courts.3 4
As a result, the GAO actively sought the passage of legisla-
tion which would re-establish judicial review of contract dispute
settlements. This effort culminated in the passage of the Wun-
derlich Act in 1954.35 The first section of the Act restored the
pre-United States v. Wunderlich standard by providing that
questions of fact are final when decided pursuant to the stand-
ard disputes clause unless the decision was fraudulent, capri-
cious, arbitrary, so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad
faith or not supported by substantial evidence.3 6 In addition,
the Act overturned Moorman by providing that the administra-
tive resolution of a government contract dispute is not final
with respect to a question of law.37
The House Report 38 which accompanied the Wunderlich bill
admitted that the purpose of the bill was to overcome the effect
of United States v. Wunderich.39 In addition to recognizing the
renewed right to judicial review of contract appeal board settle-
ments, the House Report examined the GAO's role within the
review framework:
32. 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
33. E.g., Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926); United States v.
Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U.S. 323 (.922); Plumley v. United States,
226 U.S. 545 (1913); United States v. Gleason, 175 U.S. 588 (1900).
34. See Hearings on S. 2487 Before the Subcomm. on Finality
Clauses in Government Contracts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., 4-13 (1952); Letlter from S.P. Haycock, Assistant
General Counsel of the General Accounting Office, to the author, Jan.
10, 1969, on file in the office of Minnesota Law Review [hereinafter
cited as Haycock].
35. 41 U.S.C. §§ 321, 322 (1964).
36. Id. § 321.
37. Id. § 322 provides: "No Government contract shall contain a
provision making final on a question of law the decision of any admin-
istrative official, representative, or board."
38. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1954, reprinted in 1954
U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2191.
39. 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
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The proposed legislation, as amended, will not add to, narrow,
restrict, or change in any way the present jurisdiction of the
General Accounting Office either in the course of a settlement
or upon audit, and the language used is not intended either to
change the jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office or to
grant any new jurisdiction, but simply to recognize the juris-
diction which the General Accounting Office already has.40
Thus, while the bill in its final form does not specifically refer
to the GAO, the House Report indicates that the bill was not to
be construed as limiting the GAO's authority, but rather as al-
lowing the GAO to apply judicial standards as it had prior to
Moorman and Wunderlich.41
C. REVIEw BY THE GAO
Convinced that the Wunderlich Act restored its right to re-
view, 42 the GAO has reasserted its earlier scope of review of con-
tract appeal board decisions.43 The GAO has never claimed to
possess more authority than that of the courts, 44 and therefore
has followed the judicial construction of the Wunderlich Act.45
It has, however, preciously guarded its self-assumed right to re-
view all board decisions to the same extent as the courts.46 The
Court of Claims, on the basis of the legislative history of the
Wunderlich Act, has reinforced the GAO's assumption by stat-
ing: "One of the major reasons for the passage of the new Act
was to assure to the General Accounting Office a limited right
of scrutiny comparable to (though perhaps not precisely the
same as) that given to the courts. '47 The policy behind the
GAO's position is that the contract appeal boards can and do
make mistakes to the detriment of the Government. Therefore,
since the Government's right to seek judicial review is uncer-
tain,48 the GAO feels obligated to review either upon its own
40. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1954, reprinted in 1954
U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2196.
41. Id.
42. Haycock, supra note 34, at 5.
43. E.g., 47 Comp. GEN. 378 (1968); 46 CoMP. GEN. 441 (1966).
44. E.g., 47 Comp. GEN. 378 (1968); 46 Comp. GEN. 441 (1966);
19 ComP. GEN. 568 (1939).
45. See, e.g., 47 ComP. GEN. 378, 383 (1968); 46 CoMP. GEN. 441,
454-55 (1966).
46. Id.
47. C.J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc. v. United States, 341 F.2d 600,
608 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
48. While disgruntled contractors were given the right to appeal
unfavorable board decisions by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964),
there are no such provisions available to government agencies. Though
many arguments have been advanced to support the propriety of this
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initiative, or that of the contracting agency.49
The GAO insists that the right to review decisions which
are favorable to the Government is a necessary corollary of its
authority to review those against the Government." The Court
of Claims in C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Incorporated v. United
States5' appeared to agree:
The present case does not, of course, require us to define the
full scope of the Comptroller General's authority, but the fact
that he undoubtedly has some role under the Wunderlich Act
helps to demonstrate that the statute applies to administrative
decisions favoring the contractor, as well as those which are
adverse. 52
In an unpublished letter,53 S. P. Haycock, Assistant General
Counsel of the General Accounting Office, notes that adminis-
trative rulings on questions of law are not made final by either
the standard disputes clause or tfhe Wunderlich Act. Conse-
quently, he states that the GAO believes that it has a duty to
take action if the "facts ... do not in law justify the ... dispo-
sition of a claim . . . . 4 Where the contractor appeals from
an adverse board decision, the GAO either allows the claim,
thereby binding the Government, or disallows it, thereby forcing
the contractor to seek a judicial determination of the dispute.
IV. PRESENT CONFLICT
As mentioned above, the GAO bases its right to review board
disability, the basic one is that the Government would be appealing
from its own determination. See, e.g., Spector, supra note 19. Such an
assertion is misleading since there is no indication that appeal boards
are prejudiced in favor of the Government's position. In fact, appeal
boards are generally credited with maintaining procedures that pro-
tect the interests of both parties. See 1966 Hearings, supra note 3, at
1-6.
In addition, an American Bar Association subcommittee has recently
suggested that a single federal board be formed to hear contract appeals,
thereby taking authority away from the particular agency. Under this
system, it could not be asserted that the agency is attempting to appeal
from its own decision. The proposal was presented for debate at the
A.B.A. National Institute, Mechanics of Sale and Dispute: Facets of the
Law of Public Contracts, Mar. 22, 1969, cited in Note, Alice in Wunder-
lich, supra note 19, at 556 n.60.
49. Haycock, supra note 34, at 7-8. See 46 Coivrp. GEN. 441 (1966).
50. Haycock, supra note 34, at 4. See also Op. ATT'Y Gm. (Jan.
16, 1969) at 8.
51. 341 F.2d 600 (Ct. C1. 1965).
52. Id. at 608.
53. Haycock, supra note 34, at 9.
54. Id.
[Vol. 54:694
1970] GAO REVIEW OF APPEAL BOARD DECISIONS 703
decisions on statute, 5 the legislative history to the Wunderlich
Act, 0 and the Court of Claims decision in Langenfelder.57 Ex-
ecutive agencies have taken the position that the GAO review
of a board decision which is favorable to the Government is both
unnecessary and improper. They maintain that the contractor
can always pursue his remedy in the courts, and should be forced
to do so. Furthermore, if the GAO reverses the board decision,
the Government is bound 8 without ever having been to court.
The agencies contend that the GAO in reality is just another
level of administrative review and therefore is not as well
equipped as the Court of Claims to handle dispute cases.59
The positions of the GAO and the agencies came into direct
conflict in the Southside Plumbing case6 0 in 1966. Following a
decision favoring the Government by the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals over an Air Force housing contract, South-
side Plumbing requested the GAO to review the board deter-
mination.1 After declaring his jurisdiction to hear the case, the
Comptroller General affirmed the board in part, but declared
that the one issue which involved a question of law had been
handled improperly. The Comptroller General, in a unique
move, attempted to remand the case to the contracting officer,
but provided that if agreement could not be reached between
the parties, the issue should be reconsidered by the Armed Serv-
ices Board of Contract Appeals.2
The Air Force, however, was unwilling to accede to the
Comptroller General's decision, arguing that the GAO should not
be allowed to review board decisions which are favorable to the
Government. The Air Force asked the United States Attorney
General if it should comply with the GAO's decision either as a
matter of law or of comity6 3 Attorney General Ramsey Clark,
assuming authority to decide the issues since they involved the
55. 31 U.S.C. §§ 71, 74 (1964).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 1380 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1954, Reprinted in
1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2191. See also 46 Coin.. Gm. 441
(1966); Haycock, supra note 34.
57. 341 F.2d 600 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
58. 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1964).
59. Op. ATr'Y GEN. (Jan. 16, 1969).
60. Coim. GE. unpublished opinion B-156192 (Dec. 8, 1966). Ac-
cord, the S & E Contractors case in 46 ComP. GEN. 441 (1966).
61. When the review was initiated, Southside Plumbing was known
as Progressive Construction Company.
62. Comp. GEN. unpublished opinion B-156192 at 25 (Dec. 8,
1966).
63. Op. ATT'Y GEN. (Jan. 16, 1969).
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"legal relationship between GAO and executive branch agencies
in the resolution of disputes arising under Government procure-
ment contracts, '64 responded to the Air Force's request on Janu-
ary 16, 1969,65 four days before inauguration of the new admin-
istration. The Attorney General's opinion raised several con-
troversial issues.
First, the opinion stated that by law the Air Force need not
comply with the GAO's opinion. Initially, the Attorney Gen-
eral observed that while the GAO has statutory authority to
settle and adjust claims,66 it has no authority to remand board
decisions to executive agencies for additional consideration.
Moreover, the Attorney General implied that since the GAO's
review was ex parte, the Government's interest had not been
sufficiently protected. The opinion further stated that it was
not necessary for the Air Force to comply as a matter of comity,
since the historical trend "reveals a clear shift of final decision-
making power from the accounting officers to the courts. '67 In
so concluding, the Attorney General claimed that while remand
is an appropriate disposition for courts because they ultimately
can make a decision which is binding upon both parties, a re-
mand by the GAO is inappropriate because its decision is never
binding on the contractor, who can seek judicial review.
Rather than concluding the opinion after answering the Air
Force's question, the Attorney General went on to disagree with
the GAO's interpretation of the Wunderlich Act and to contend
that Congress had no intention o: establishing the GAO as an
additional level of administrative appeal. The Attorney General
struck at the heart of the GAO's "corollary" theory by contend-
ing that the GAO need not necessarily exercise the right to re-
view decisions adverse to the Government. If the GAO dis-
agrees with a board decision favoring the contractor, said the
Attorney General, it may disallow the item. The contracting
agency, maintaining the correctness of its position, will then set
off that amount on sums due the contractor. "Such an offset
will effectively force an ultimate judicial determination of the
validity of the disputes clause decision, through suit by the con-
tractor to recover the withheld payment. s68 By specifically rec-
ognizing the GAO's power to disallow government appeals in
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 1.
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id. at 7.
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this manner, however, the Attorney General, in effect, preserved
the area of review that the GAO desires most-the right to
review board decisions which are against the Government to in-
sure protection of the Government's rights.
The Attorney General also noted that such action by the
GAO is not the Government's only means of obtaining relief
from unfavorable board decisions.
The contracting agency, acting through the Department of Jus-
tice as the Government's counsel in claims litigation, is also
able to obtain such review on its own initiative.... [Tihe
executive branch is capable of obtaining judicial review through
the very devices-withholding payment or recovery by later
set-off-on which GAO must rely.69
Thus, the Attorney General maintained that if the agency alone
feels that the board has made an improper decision, it may force
the issue before the courts independently of any GAO determi-
nation.
Finally and most importantly, the Attorney General indi-
cated that if a board decision against the government appears
to be erroneous, the Justice Department has the right and re-
sponsibility to appeal it to the courts. In support of this, the
Attorney General stated: "It is clear . . . from the legislative
history of the Wunderlich Act, taken as a whole, that Congress
intended board decisions to be no more conclusive against the
Government than against a contractor. ' 70 If this last conten-
tion is in fact true, the basis for the GAO's self-assumed right
to review is greatly weakened, since there is another avenue open
to an agency which feels the board's decision is erroneous.
Two subsequent developments, however, have increased the
complexity of the conflict over the proper role of the GAO.
Within a week after the Attorney General's opinion, Louis Spec-
tor, former chairman of the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals and presently commissioner of the Court of Claims, is-
sued a commissioner's opinion directly contradicting the Attor-
ney General's position. Spector stated in part, "there is little
doubt that the right to obtain judicial review of board decisions,
as provided for in the Wunderlich Act and the current Disputes
clause, is solely for the contractor's benefit."71 Shortly there-
69. Id. at 9.
70. Id. at 10. See also Note, S & E Contractors and the GAO Role
in Government Contract Disputes: A Funny Thing Happened on the
Way to Finality, 55 VA. L. Rnv. 762, 772-76 (1969).
71. J.L. Simmons Co. v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 2424 (Jan. 21,
1969).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
after, the Comptroller General informed Attorney General John
Mitchell that the GAO did not consider itself bound by the opin-
ion of Attorney General Clark, and therefore would continue to
review board decisions. 72
V. POSSIBLE RE, SOLUTION
While functional problems do exist,7 3 boards of contract ap-
peals have generally proven to be an effective means of settle-
ment for government contract disputes. 74  Irrespective of the
boards' effectiveness, however, it is imperative that the rights
of both parties to the contract be protected. Thus, the GAO's
ultimate goal of protecting the Government's interest is beyond
dispute. But while it is generally agreed that board decisions
should be reviewed, the conflict arises over who should conduct
the review.
In attempting to maintain a logically consistent scheme, two
opposing positions have been presented-the GAO's dogmatic
assertion that it has the authority to review all board decisions
and the Executive's contention that review of board decisions
which are favorable to the Government are unacceptable. Nei-
ther position, however, takes account of the significant fact that
the policy considerations present after the board decides in favor
of the Government are different from those present after it
decides in favor of the contractor. In order to protect all of the
interests, the appeal procedure should be directly related to
the actual board determination.
If the board has rendered a decision in favor of the Govern-
ment, the GAO should take no further action, even if requested
to do so by the contractor. The reasoning behind this position
is that the GAO's refusal to review will force the contractor
to pursue his case in the Court of Claims, thereby insuring judi-
cial review in compliance with the standards of due process.
Moreover, if the GAO did review and decide in favor of the con-
tractor, the Government would be barred from ever having its
position before the courts, notwithstanding its success before the
72. Letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General, to Attorney
General, Feb. 7, 1969.
73. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 31-33.
74. See generally Hiestand & Parler, The Disputes Procedure Un-
der Government Contracts: The Role of Appeal Boards and the Courts,
8 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 1 (1966); Cuneo & Truit, Discovery Before
the Contract Appeals Boards, 8 Wm. & MARY L. RE'v. 505 (1967);
Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals, 29 LAw & CONTEMP%. PROB. 39 (1964).
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board.75 The GAO, unequipped to handle numerous appeals,
should not hear contractor's appeals which would in effect result
in the creation of an additional layer of administrative decision-
making.
The same policy considerations, however, are not present
when the appeal board has rendered a decision in favor of the
contractor. Appeal boards do make mistakes; therefore some
procedure should be established to insure the protection of the
Government's interest. The difficulty exists in what procedure
should be used.7 0 Since the GAO in its financial capacity is di-
rectly concerned with settlement of disputes, it would seem un-
wise to eliminate the GAO entirely from the procedure. Thus,
upon issuance of a board decision which is unfavorable to the
Government, the GAO, on its own initiative or that of the con-
tracting agency, could make a preliminary evaluation of whether
the board's decision is meritorious. If the GAO concludes that
the board had erred, the GAO could recommend that the Attor-
ney General initiate a suit in the Court of Claims.7 7 Recognizing
that this may presently be impossible, specific statutory author-
ity for the Attorney General to bring suit on behalf of the
agency should be provided, thereby insuring judicial review
under the standards of the Wunderlich Act.
Such a procedure would seem to accomplish all of the ob-
jectives sought: (1) elimination of the GAO as an additional
level of administrative appeal, while preserving its right to ef-
fectively review board decisions which are against the Govern-
ment; (2) establishment of a procedure which will protect the
Government's rights by allowing administrative agencies re-
course in the courts, and (3) forcing disgruntled contractors to
seek relief in the Court of Claims. Thus, both the private con-
tractor and the Government would be able to obtain judicial re-
view in accordance with the standards of the Wunderlich Act.
75. 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1964). If the GAO should reverse a board deci-
sion adverse to the Government's interest, the agencies would find
themselves in a difficult position. If the Attorney General is correct in
his evaluation, judicial review could be obtained. But if the agency
executes a settlement with the contractor in an attempt to comply with
the GAO's order, judicial review might be foreclosed entirely.
76. See Commissioner Spector's recent opinion in J.L. Simmons Co.
v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 2424 (Jan. 21, 1969).
77. No attempt is here made to determine the precise procedure
that the General Accounting Office should use. Possibly, the claim
could be paid first and suit then brought for recovery for improper pay-
ment. Another solution might be to offset the payment on another con-
tract, thus forcing the contractor to initiate a suit.
